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AT THE FRONTIERS OF THE  
RUSH FOR BLUE GOLD:  
WATER PRIVATIZATION AND  
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ater has been called the last frontier of privatization around the 
world.1 Public bodies still supply over 90 percent of the world’s 
water2 and finance around 90 percent of the developing world’s3 invest-
ment in water and sewage systems.4 Yet, by the end of 2000, municipali-
ties in at least ninety-three countries underwent partial privatization of 
water or wastewater services, including communist countries such as 
China and Cuba.5 Municipalities in still other countries are in the process 
of privatizing or evaluating the prospects of private sector involvement.6 
Furthermore, international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
                                                                                                             
 1. Elizabeth Brubaker, Editorial, A Thirst for Privatization: With More than 1.1 
Billion People Worldwide Lacking Access to Safe Drinking Water, Governments Are 
Increasingly Turning to the Private Sector for Help, NAT’L POST (Can.), Jan. 9, 2003 
(attributing the remark to a journalist of the Financial Times). 
 2. Private Passions, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 6. 
 3. The terms “developing world” and “developing countries” refer to recipients, 
rather than donors, of international aid and assistance. This usage is adopted out of con-
venience, although it is important to note that the customary distinction between “devel-
oped” and “developing” countries is problematic in view of recent rethinking of the term 
“development,” such as in the work of the Nobel prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen. 
Sen’s approach to development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people 
enjoy” and, conversely, of “poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities rather than 
merely as lowness of incomes” blurs the customary distinction between “developed” and 
“developing countries.”  See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 1, 87 (2000). For 
instance, Sen points out that although in terms of income African-Americans are many 
times richer compared to populations of developing countries, their “capability” to live 
long lives is comparatively lower than that of populations in some developing countries. 
Id. at 96. I am thankful to Professor Samuel Murumba for pointing me to the work of 
Amartya Sen. 
 4. How Not to Help Those in Need: Third-World Water and the Private Sector, 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004, at 11, available at 2004 WLNR 10885720. 
 5. Brubaker, supra note 1 (observing that some form of water privatization took 
place in the three countries of North America, twenty-three countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, twenty countries in Europe, thirty countries in Africa and the Middle 
East, and seventeen countries in Asia and the Far East). 
 6. See, e.g., Gifty Korantemaa, Ghana to Derive Negative Benefits from Water Pri-
vatization—Coalition Against Water Privatization, GHANIAN CHRON., Jan. 6, 2006, avail-
able at 2006 WLNR 361576 (discussing water privatization in Ghana); Stephen David, 
Whose Water is it Anyway?, INDIA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
19996247 (discussing water privatization in Bangalore, India). 
W
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have consistently supported privatization, especially in developing coun-
tries, often making privatization of utilities a precondition for loans, debt 
reprogramming, or loan forgiveness.7 
Accompanying the global trend of water privatization, water services 
have been consolidated within the hands of a few powerful multinational 
companies.8 Each of the two largest water multinationals provides water 
services to about 110 million people.9 The combined revenue potential of 
multinational water companies measures close to $3 trillion.10 
Despite this clear global pattern, privatization of water services has not 
gone unopposed. Large protests have attended governments’ attempts to 
privatize water in many countries.11 Most famously, community protests 
                                                                                                             
 7. A study of World Bank loans between 1996 and November 2002 by the Interna-
tional Consortium of Investigative Journalists reported that the World Bank conditioned 
loans on the privatization of water services in about one third of its projects. Center for 
Public Integrity, Promoting Privatization, Feb. 3, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
water/report.aspx?sID=ch&rID=44&aID=45. The study considered 276 long-term in-
vestment loans and short-term structural adjustment loans that the Bank had labeled “wa-
ter supply,” and did not include combined loans. Id. Furthermore, the study also found 
that the number of loans conditioned on privatization had tripled in the period after 1996 
compared to the period before 1996. Id. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
supported similar policies. See, e.g., Varsha Gupta D’Souza, Development: IMF’s Chief 
New Economist Could Signal Policy Shift, INTER PRESS SERV., July 14, 2003 (remarking 
that an IMF loan to Nicaragua required the privatization of water, despite contrary do-
mestic legislation). 
 8. See Marty Logan, Finance: Corporations Said to Eye Water Privatization in U.S., 
INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 4, 2003 (noting that while Europe-based multinational compa-
nies operated in a mere dozen countries in 1990, they were present in fifty-six countries 
and two territories by 2003). 
 9. The Center for Public Integrity has documented the international presence of the 
major multinational water companies, including their former and present subsidiaries. See 
generally Center for Public Integrity, The Water Barons, http://www.icij.org/water/ 
db.aspx?sID=db (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (noting that Vivendi Environment (now Ve-
olia Environment) operates in over one hundred countries and provides water services to 
110 million people, Suez operates in forty-one countries and provides water to 115 mil-
lion people, while the third largest provider of water services, RWE AG, serves more 
than 70 million people worldwide). 
 10. Logan, supra note 8 (noting also that Vivendi Universal’s revenues from water-
related services increased from $5 billion in 1990 to $12 billion in 2002). See also Bill 
Marsden, Cholera and the Age of the Water Barons, Feb. 3, 2003, http://www.icij.org/ 
water/report.aspx?sID=ch&rID=44&aID=44 (observing that RWE’s revenues from water 
grew “a whopping 9,786 percent,” from $25 million in 1990 to $2.5 billion in 2002). 
 11. See, e.g., Provinces Protest Proposed Water Law, BUS. NEWS AMERICAS, July 27, 
2004 (reporting that farmers and indigenous groups protested privatization proposals by 
Ecuador’s government fearing that privatization would endanger local community prac-
tices). In Paraguay, protests forced the government to postpone the reinstatement of a 
privatization bill, including provisions for the sale of the national water authority, which 
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in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000 resulted in the “water war,” forcing the 
Bolivian government to repeal the water law allowing for privatization, 
and to revoke the concession contract with a multinational consortium.12 
Furthermore, some governments have rejected water privatization despite 
pressure by international financial institutions.13 In another remarkable 
development, a 2004 referendum in Uruguay approved a constitutional 
reform defining water as a public good and a human right, and ensuring 
                                                                                                             
had been previously repealed in 2002 due to public unrest. Kate Joynes, Paraguayan 
Government Concedes to Anti-Privatisation Protesters, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Aug. 
20, 2004. In Thailand, a series of protests at a local and international level stalled the 
privatization of water in 2004.  See, e.g., Labor Unions Launch Nationwide Anti-
Privatization Roadshow, FNWEB DAILY NEWS, June 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
7272488 (describing Thailand’s labor unions’ strategy of garnering popular support 
against the privatization of state water and electricity utilities); Protest at Thai Embassy 
in Brussels over Privatisation; ICEM’s Executive Interrupts Session for Protest, M2 
PRESSWIRE, May 27, 2004, available at Westlaw: 5/27/04 M2PW (reporting a demonstra-
tion against the Thai government’s privatization plans by 120 trade union leaders from 
forty countries in front of the Embassy of Thailand in Belgium); Pravit Rojanaphruk, 
10,000 Rally Against Plan to Privatise Utilities, NATION (Thail.), Mar. 28, 2004 (report-
ing an anti-privatization rally organized by 135 non-governmental and grass-roots or-
ganizations, which drew about 10,000 people). Public protests had also accompanied 
earlier instances of privatization in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, South Africa, Poland, and 
Hungary. See William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, at 43, 53. 
 12. For a comprehensive background on the Cochabamba water war, see generally 
Finnegan, supra note 11; JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE 99–114 (2001). In 
the aftermath of the water war, the Bolivian government passed new legislation guaran-
teeing traditional communal practices and public participation in determining rates, and 
prioritizing social needs. Finnegan, supra note 11, at 51. Cochabamba’s water utility was 
transferred back into public hands. Id. For a legal discussion of the situation in Cocha-
bamba from a human rights perspective, see Maria McFarland Sánchez-Moreno & Tracy 
Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1663, 1747–89 (2004). For 
a legal analysis from the perspective of risk management, see Erik J. Woodhouse, Note, 
The “Guerra Del Agua” and the Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign 
Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003). 
 13. See, e.g., María Teresa Ronderos, A Tale of Two Cities, Feb. 11, 2003, http:// 
www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=53 (recounting how the city of Bogotá, 
Colombia, refused to privatize its utility despite repeated pressure by the World Bank). 
The Water and Sewerage Company of Bogotá, Colombia has become “one of the most 
efficient, profitable and equitable water utilities in Colombia.” Sarah Garland, Keeping it 
Public in Bogota, 38 NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, July 1, 2004, available at 2004 
WLNR 11659096. In 2002, the company came out first in ratings by Colombia’s Na-
tional Planning Commission, ahead of the privatized water utilities, while in 2004, it 
received the second highest international credit rating for the second year in a row. Id. 
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that its management would remain in public hands.14 Commentators have 
said the reform sets a strong political precedent globally for the use of 
referenda to protect against privatization.15 
The controversy surrounding water privatization reflects different re-
sponses to what the international community has recognized as a world 
water crisis.16 Over one billion people lack access to safe drinking wa-
ter,17 while over two billion lack access to adequate sanitation.18 Illnesses 
caused by lack of safe water, such as diarrheal diseases, kill over two 
million people each year.19 Water conditions have been tied to 60 percent 
of the world’s illness.20 Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
comprise the most severely affected regions.21 
                                                                                                             
 14. Raúl Pierri, Uruguay: Referendum Gives Resounding ‘No’ to the Privatisation of 
Water, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 1, 2004. The referendum took place on October 31, 
2004, coinciding with the national election. Id. 
 15. See id. (quoting from a letter by the environmental group Friends of the Earth, 
signed by 127 organizations from 36 countries, which stated that the referendum “sets a 
key precedent for the protection of water worldwide, by enshrining these principles into 
the national constitution of one country by direct democracy”). Activists in Thailand have 
similarly called on the government to organize a referendum to decide the issue of priva-
tization. Labor Unions Launch Nationwide Anti-Privatization Roadshow, supra note 11; 
Rojanaphruk, supra note 11. 
 16. A multi-agency United Nations report referring to the “world water crisis” pro-
vides a comprehensive overview of the crisis, its causes and proposed solutions, as well 
as a history of international water policies. See generally WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME, UNESCO, THE UN WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WATER FOR 
PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE (2003), available at http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/ 
table_contents.shtml [hereinafter WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (asserting that lifestyle 
changes, population increases, urbanization, and globalization are contributing factors to 
the world water crisis). See also MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD 3–76 
(2002). 
 17. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER 3 (2003), available at http://www. 
who.int/water_sanitation_health/rtwrev.pdf [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO WATER]. 
 18. WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 10. 
 19. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 6. According to quoted data, more chil-
dren have died from diarrhea in the ten years preceding 2000 than from armed conflict 
since the Second World War. Id. at 7. 
 20. Priceless, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 4. 
 21. The situation is particularly acute in Africa, where up to 40 percent of the popula-
tion remains with inadequate access to water and sanitation, while only 3 percent of the 
continent’s renewable water is put to use, 6 percent of its land is irrigated, and less than 5 
percent of its hydropower potential is used. JAMES WINPENNY, WORLD PANEL ON 
FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 5 (2003) [hereinafter 
CAMDESSUS REPORT, after Michel Camdessus, former managing director of the IMF, who 
chaired the panel]. In Asia, 19 percent of the population remains without water, and 52 
percent without sanitation, while in Latin America and the Caribbean the respective fig-
ures are 15 percent and 22 percent. Id. 
2006] WATER PRIVATIZATION 581 
The international community has determined to combat the water crisis 
at the global level. In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the 
General Assembly vowed “to halve the proportion of people who are 
unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water” by 2015.22 At the Jo-
hannesburg World Summit in 2002, the world community further agreed 
to reduce by half the proportion of people without access to basic sanita-
tion.23 Progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
has varied.24 In part, this is due to the increase of the world’s population, 
which offsets the increasing number of people who have obtained access 
to water.25 According to some estimates, reaching the Millennium Goals 
by the target date would require increasing investments from the current 
$30 billion to $75 billion to cover the costs of providing universal access 
to water.26 The United Nation estimated in 2002 that Asia, Latin Amer-
ica, and Africa should not expect universal access to safe drinking water 
before 2025, 2040, and 2050 respectively, at then-current rates of in-
vestment.27 
Against this backdrop, proponents of privatization look to private sec-
tor involvement as a way to improve water access and sanitation, espe-
                                                                                                             
 22. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, para. 19, U.N. GAOR, 
55th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). In addition, the Mil-
lennium Declaration resolved to “stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources 
by developing water management strategies at the regional, national and local levels, 
which promote both equitable access and adequate supplies.”  Id. para. 23. 
 23. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26–
Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
para. 8, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20. 
 24. See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN 
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index_overview.htm. For example, the tar-
get of halving the proportion of people without clean drinking water in urban areas has 
been met in most regions, except for Eastern Asia. On the other hand, with respect to 
rural areas, the progress toward achieving the target is lagging in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Eastern, South-Eastern and Western Asia, as well as in Latin America and the Carribean. 
Id. 
 25. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 5 (observing that, because of popula-
tion growth, coverage for urban water has decreased despite the fact that, during the 
1990s, 800 million people obtained access to water and 750 million to sanitation). 
 26. Brubaker, supra note 1 (noting that although estimates tend to vary, they usually 
surpass current or planned public spending). A report completed in 2000 under the aus-
pices of the World Water Council and the Global Water Partnership estimated that in 
poor countries, about $75–80 billion were invested in water annually, an amount that 
would have to be raised to $180 billion to reach the Millennium Goals. Priceless, supra 
note 20. 
 27. A Few Green Shoots—The World Summit in Johannesburg, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 
2002, at 65. 
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cially in cash-strapped less developed countries.28 Opponents contend 
that water governance should not be left to market forces.29 They argue 
that water is a human right and should remain under the control of public 
bodies taking into account social fairness and environmental sustainabil-
ity.30 
Taking account of this debate, this Note examines the nascent devel-
opments of human rights law regarding corporate accountability for hu-
man rights and the human right to water. While the Note starts from the 
premise that water is a human right, it also proceeds from the descriptive 
proposition that water privatization is, for better or worse, a global real-
ity.31 The Note proposes that corporate accountability for the human right 
                                                                                                             
 28. See WORLD BANK, WATER—A PRIORITY FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION: AN AGENDA FOR INVESTMENT AND POLICY CHANGE 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/ 
04/25/000094946_03041604014623/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Delivered at the 
Third World Water Forum in Kyoto, the working paper notes, among other things, the 
importance of “exploring public-private partnership options to attract the required in-
crease in financial resources devoted to water investments,” under the rubric “the need 
for a new global deal on water.”  Id. See also Marwaan Macan-Markar, World Bank 
Backs Privatizing Water, Critics Dismayed, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2003. The 
European Commission has also urged “partnerships between public, private and civil 
society actors.”  See Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the 
Future Development of the EU Water Initiative and the Modalities for the Establishment 
of a Water Facility for ACP Countries, at 7, COM(2004) 43 final (Jan. 26, 2004),  
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/dpi/cnc/doc/2004/com2004_0043en01.doc 
[hereinafter European Commission Communication]. The communication states that such 
promotion must ensure “that those partnerships remain equitable and transparent, allow 
free and reversible choices on water services management, safeguard consumers’ and 
investors’ interests, and maintain high standards of environmental protection.” Id. In 
addition, the communication specifically affirms that the European Community “is taking 
a neutral stance on the ownership of public utilities.” Id. A subsequent portion of the 
communication, however, speaks of the need for “better mechanisms to use development 
aid to leverage other resources (private, development banks, financial institutions, users’ 
contributions, remittances, etc).” Id. at 11. According to activists, such use of aid subsi-
dizes the privatization of water management. See Stefania Bianchi, Development-EU: 
Civil Groups Fear More Water Privatization, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2004, avail-
able at Westlaw: 3/17/04 INTERPS. 
 29. Mario Osava, South Could Become Scenario of Water Wars, INTER PRESS SERV., 
Mar. 21, 2003 (setting forth the positions of the organizers of the World Social Forum, an 
alternative gathering designed to compete with the World Water Forum, which some 
activists see as forwarding a corporate agenda). 
 30. Id. It is important to note, however, that although opponents of water privatization 
invariably cite that water is a human right, not all human rights proponents oppose water 
privatization. See infra Part V.A and notes 204–05. 
 31. This Note does not examine other corollaries of the global trend of water privati-
zation and commodification of water, such as the impact of the international trade regime 
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to water may assuage the problems raised by water privatization, without 
dispensing with privatization per se. This challenge is twofold to the ex-
tent that both corporate liability for human rights violations and the hu-
man right to water are relatively recent and still contested notions. Tak-
ing up these developments, the Note contends that, especially where host 
governments may be weak, corrupt, or otherwise unable to regulate pri-
vate water providers, it is of utmost importance that multinational water 
companies are bound by a duty to the local populations they serve. 
Part II describes the global trend to privatize water, theories underpin-
ning this trend, and critiques. Part III expounds the legal basis and the 
scope of the human right to water. Part IV sets forth the current devel-
opments in theories of corporate accountability for international human 
rights violations. Part V analyzes in greater detail the scope of the human 
rights liability of private water providers for the human right to water and 
defends its desirability, while also setting forth objections and potential 
difficulties in enforcement. 
II. WATER PRIVATIZATION: HISTORY, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND CRITIQUES 
A. Water Privatization in a Historical Context 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the principal source of funding water in-
frastructure in the developing world came in the form of aid by interna-
tional development agencies, international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank, and government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for 
International Development.32 Privatized water systems in the 1980s were 
the rare exception rather than the rule, and international funding was di-
rected entirely at public entities until 1990.33 In 1989, the sale of water 
utilities in Great Britain by the government of Margaret Thatcher34 set 
off the global trend of privatization of water utilities.35 
                                                                                                             
and the World Trade Organization. For an extended discussion of potential developments 
in this direction, see Rona Nardone, Note, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World’s 
Water Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 183 (2003). 
 32. Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries via 
Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 91 (1995). 
 33. According to the Camdessus Report, private water systems operated only in 
France, parts of Francophone Africa, areas in Great Britain, a few cities in Spain, and 
some distribution schemes in the United States. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 7. 
 34. The government of Margaret Thatcher listed all ten English and Welsh water 
utilities on the market. See Private Passions, supra note 2. The total transfer of assets to 
private entities has become known as the “British model” of water privatization. Id. For a 
commentary on the British lessons of water privatization, see Stagnant—Britain’s Stag-
nant Water Industry, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2003, at 54. See also Nardone, supra note 31, 
at 192 (noting that the primary advantage of assets sale is that it increases the availability 
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Few other countries, however, have followed the British model,36 
adopting instead a variety of public-private combinations.37 The so-called 
French model38 consists of various concession arrangements under which 
different portions of the water system, such as operation and manage-
ment, are granted to private entities on a long-term basis.39 Public water 
corporations with private and public shareholders (with the latter usually 
being the majority) exemplify a third model of privatization, which some 
have extolled as successfully combining private shareholders’ efficiency 
goals with public shareholders’ goals of equitable access and afforda-
bility.40 Finally, under a fourth model, the government contracts out op-
eration and management to private bidders in a competitive bidding 
process.41 
                                                                                                             
of capital that can be put to alternative uses, but that regulation and public protection may 
be lacking). 
 35. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 7. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Patricia Grogg, Cuba: Havana Improves Water Supply with Spanish 
Investment, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 26, 2003. Cuba has retained ownership of assets in 
public hands. Id. The Cuban-Spanish company Aquas de la Habana started upgrading 
Havana’s water system in 2000, and now runs the piped water, drainage, and sewer ser-
vices in multiple districts of Havana. Id. 
 38. This model known as “affermage” originated in the nineteenth century, with the 
establishment of Generale des Eaux, now owned by Veolia, by Napoleon III in 1852, and 
the establishment of Lyonnaise des Eaux, now owned by Suez, in 1880. See Savoir Faire, 
ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 7. 
 39. See Nardone, supra note 31, at 191. For instance, the Build-Operate-Transfer 
model (BOT), as its name suggests, allows a private company to build and operate a par-
ticular project for a certain time period, after which it will transfer ownership to the host 
country. See generally Kerr, supra note 32 (arguing in support of the BOT model for 
funding water infrastructure in developing countries). The prime advantage of this model 
is that cash-strapped governments in developing countries do not have to tap into their 
scarce budgets for funding or taking out loans. Id. at 92–93. This model envisions an 
important role for international financial institutions, ranging from risk insurance to debt 
or equity assistance. Id. at 95–96. Indeed, the heads of Suez and Veolia have favored the 
public-private partnership of the French model. Savoir Faire, supra note 38. However, 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Miloon Kothari, has 
pointed out that a French official audit report discredited this model in 1997. Miloon 
Kothari, Privatizing Human Rights—The Impact of Globalisation on Access to Adequate 
Housing, Water and Sanitation, n.10 (2003), http://socialwatch.org/en/informes 
Tematicos/66.html. The model’s major shortcomings were corruption, lack of transpar-
ency, lack of competition, and the concentration of immense power within the hands of 
conglomerates at the expense of elected public officials. Id. 
 40. Nardone, supra note 31, at 191. 
 41. See id. See also Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1892 (2005) (noting that this is the least controversial form of privati-
zation). Glennon also mentions a fifth possibility of giving private companies ownership 
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In the mid-1990s, the domestic public sector accounted for up to 70 
percent of investment in water and sanitation.42 Participation by the do-
mestic private sector comprised a mere 5 percent, while international 
private companies and international donations accounted for between 10 
and 15 percent each.43 In a parallel development, by the late-1990s, in-
ternational aid for water and sanitation had fallen slightly compared to 
aid in the mid-1990s, while aid for irrigation, drainage, and hydropower 
had declined substantially.44 The World Panel on Financing Water Infra-
structure has described the peaks and drops of private investment and 
bank lending in water and sanitation as part of the general decline in fi-
nancial currents since the mid-1990s.45 However, the remaining factors 
accounting for the decline in water investment stem from risks specific to 
the water sector.46 
Following the economic crises in Argentina and other countries, the 
trend to private operation had “come to a virtual stand-still.”47 The new-
est trend is to combine the expertise and management skills of private 
companies with other bodies, with the private company having a small 
equity stake.48 Recent reports warn that companies increasingly divest 
from developing countries and look to the American market instead be-
cause of high investment risks and significant losses that some multina-
tional water companies suffered during the economic collapses in devel-
oping countries.49 
In view of these developments, international financial institutions have 
increased their calls for privatization. A 2003 World Bank paper called 
for more private sector involvement in water.50 A declaration by minis-
                                                                                                             
of water itself and observes that this form of privatization raises a number of problems, 
ranging from the danger of unequal distribution between rich and poor, to lack of trans-
parency and public participation. Id. at 1893. 
 42. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 6. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 7 (noting that in 1996–1998 international aid for water and sanitation 
amounted to $3.5 billion, while in 1999–2001, the figure declined to $3.1 billion). 
 45. Id. 
 46. According to experts, investment in water infrastructure is more capital intensive 
than any other infrastructure project, and in particular twice as high as investments in 
natural gas, and 70 percent higher than investments in electricity and telecommunica-
tions. Id. at 10. In addition, the water sector yields the lowest financial rates of return than 
any other sector. Id. at 11. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. Private Passions, supra note 2. 
 49. Logan, supra note 8. A January 2003 report by Public Services International 
stated that Suez was planning to divest a third of its water services in developing coun-
tries following the Asian currency collapse in the 1990s. Id. 
 50. WORLD BANK, supra note 28, at 2. 
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ters adopted at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto in March 2003 
also focused on the concept of “public-private partnership” to ensure safe 
water and provide revenue for better water sanitation, environmental pro-
tections, and irrigation systems.51 In January 2004, a proposal by the 
European Commission to allocate $1.2 billion to improve water access 
and sanitation of a block of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
Pacific, called for the adoption of innovative solutions, including expan-
sion of private sector involvement.52 
B. The Case for Water Privatization 
The global trend of water privatization has been explained in part as a 
result of “sheer, desperate need” of developing countries for investment 
in water.53 Another contributing factor is the global support of interna-
tional financial institutions and political bodies.54 To understand its ap-
peal, however, it is necessary to delve into the failures of prior models of 
international aid to public entities prevalent until the early-1990s. 
The funding needs of the water sector have consistently outstripped 
available aid, constituting a major setback of the international aid model 
prevalent before the 1990s.55 In addition, multilateral aid programs have 
suffered from inattention to local input by affected residents, have fi-
nanced projects that have been both environmentally and economically 
unsustainable, and have failed to help the world’s poorest countries.56 
Bilateral aid programs have been critiqued for adversely affecting com-
petition, and hence quality of services, by tying aid to specific goods and 
services from designated countries.57 
                                                                                                             
 51. See Third World Water Forum, Mar. 22–23, 2003, Kyoto, Japan, Ministerial Dec-
laration—Message from the Lake Biwa and Yodo River Basin, para. 6 (Mar. 23, 2003), 
http://www.world.water-forum3.com/jp/mc/md_final.pdf [hereinafter Ministerial Decla-
ration]. 
 52. European Commission Communication, supra note 28, at 11. The proposal explic-
itly incorporates the findings of the Camdessus Report. See id. Critics have expressed 
fears that the proposal is more about protecting corporate welfare than the people of the 
world’s poorest nations. See Julio Godoy, Analysis, Politics—G8: Activists Fear Summit 
Agenda Could be Hijacked, INTER PRESS SERV., May 28, 2003. 
 53. Brubaker, supra note 1 (noting also that developed countries are attracted to the 
private sector as well, despite the fact that they have more resources available, because 
reliance on the private sector frees up funds for alternative uses, moves risks away, and 
reduces costs due to the private sector’s greater efficiency). 
 54. See supra notes 7 and 28 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Kerr, supra note 32, at 94. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 95. 
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Furthermore, defenders of privatization point out that public utilities 
have largely failed to provide water access to those who most need it, 
namely the poor.58 This failure has been tied to a host of factors ranging 
from corruption, inefficiency, and lack of investments, to frequent leak-
ages of old infrastructures.59 Public management of water has also been 
criticized for grossly underpricing water, with most of the de facto subsi-
dies in developing countries accruing to the middle classes who have 
access to piped water,60 leaving poor residents at the mercy of private 
vendors who charge as much as ten times higher.61 The opportunity cost 
on time spent to obtain water comprises an additional burden on the 
poor.62 
Proponents of privatization argue from a market perspective that pri-
vate sector involvement increases efficiency, attracts more finance, and 
thus helps build new and much needed infrastructure, especially in de-
veloping countries.63 Perhaps most importantly, privatization depoliti-
cizes the regulation of water and allows for a better reflection of costs in 
prices, since governments can shift the responsibility for pricing onto the 
private sector.64 Proper pricing is critical because it encourages sustain-
able use of water.65 According to a World Bank senior executive, “water 
pricing is an essential instrument to enhance the sustainability of the re-
source.”66 A further advantage of private sector involvement and the 
proper pricing that comes with it is that lenders are more willing to fi-
                                                                                                             
 58. See Bogged Down—The Private Sector’s Role in Water Supply, ECONOMIST, Mar. 
22, 2003, at 15. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Sheila M. Olmstead, What’s Price Got to Do with It?, ENV’T, Dec. 1, 2003, at 
22 (noting that in many instances subsidies end up being misdirected both because they 
benefit wealthier residents already connected to the water network, but also because sub-
sidies supported by taxes impose a heavier burden on low-income households). 
 61. Bogged Down—The Private Sector’s Role in Water Supply, supra note 58. See 
also To Market, to Market, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 16. 
 62. Olmstead, supra note 60. 
 63. Brubaker, supra note 1 (contending that the private sector “enjoys greater latitude 
to pursue efficiencies” because of market discipline, better expertise, economies of scale, 
and its freedom from social goals such as creation of jobs, which in the author’s view 
hinder productivity); Kerr, supra note 32, at 92–93. See also CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra 
note 21, at 32. 
 64. Brubaker, supra note 1. 
 65. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 18 (arguing that “full cost recovery 
from users is the ideal long-term aim”). See also Priceless, supra note 20 (noting that 
water has been “colossally underpriced,” which leads to its overuse and misuse, and con-
tending that these problems would be best corrected by sensible pricing, which should 
reflect costs, including environmental ones). 
 66. Macan-Markar, supra note 28. 
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nance water projects without requiring large equity at the outset by fo-
cusing instead on expected revenue for repayment.67 
Despite the fact that proponents of privatization highlight cost recov-
ery, many concede that water is more than a mere commodity.68 Because 
water is so essential, proponents of private-sector involvement acknowl-
edge that pricing has to take into account such social factors as the in-
ability of poor residents to pay.69 The World Panel on Financing Water 
Infrastructure has coined the concept of “sustainable cost recovery” 
which embraces the goal of full cost recovery in the long term, while 
supporting targeted “pro-poor” subsidies in the meantime.70 Finally, even 
in the case of full privatization of assets, commentators have pointed out 
that privatization is in fact a misnomer, considering the heavy govern-
mental regulation ranging from tariffs to limitations on the use of assets 
such as sewers and public stations.71 As one commentator has put it, “the 
choice is really between regulated public monopolies and regulated pri-
vate monopolies, not between upstanding private service institutions and 
profiteering capitalists.”72 
C. The Case Against Water Privatization 
Opponents of privatization frequently cite the mixed, and in some 
cases dismal record of private companies in developing countries.73 One 
                                                                                                             
 67. Kerr, supra note 32, at 92–93. 
 68. See, e.g., CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at vii (“[A]ccess to water is a right 
and a basic need.”). A Suez official had even said that “water is too essential to life to be 
a commodity,” and that “it is absolutely irresponsible to privatise in developing coun-
tries,” prompting comments that he “sounds like an anti-market activist.” A Few Green 
Shoots, supra note 27. See also Marwaan Macan-Markar, Cambodia: At last, Tap Water, 
Tap Water Everywhere, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 18, 2003 (quoting the chief financial 
officer of Manila Water, one of the two private companies supplying water to Manila, as 
saying that “governments must not give up holding the right to water” and that companies 
“are only leasing it”). 
 69. See To Market, to Market, supra note 61 (pointing to the Chilean government’s 
policy of charging full prices for water, but giving stamps to poor residents to pay their 
bills, and to the South African policy of providing a minimum supply of water for free). 
See also Olmstead, supra note 60 (arguing that uniform tariffs with rebates for low-
income households are best suited to meet distributional goals). 
 70. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 18–19. 
 71. Private Passions, supra note 2. 
 72. Olmstead, supra note 60 (adding that the key issue is regulation). 
 73. The Center for Public Integrity has published a series of reports discussing devel-
oping countries’ experiences with water privatization. See, e.g., Andreas Harsono, Water 
and Politics in the Fall of Suharto, Feb. 10, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
water/report.aspx?aid=52 (discussing at length the process of privatization in Jakarta, 
Indonesia under the Suharto dictatorship, backed by the World Bank, and noting that the 
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study based on a year-long investigation in various countries concluded 
that multinational companies in the water business constantly push for 
higher prices, frequently fail to meet their commitments, and will aban-
don the project if returns are too low.74 Privatizing water is likely to re-
duce access to clean water because of rate increases.75 Making people 
pay the full cost of water has in one instance directly caused a cholera 
epidemic infecting more than 250,000 people and killing nearly 300.76 In 
the Philippines, for instance, five years after the privatization of Manila’s 
water system in 1997,77 residents still complained that the price of water 
kept going up even under the supposedly more efficient system.78 Aside 
from rate increases, observers also cite the concessionaires’ failures to 
meet their contractually-set service targets.79 According to commenta-
                                                                                                             
companies’ record of providing water access to the poor and improving finances was 
mixed); Daniel Santoro, The ‘Aguas’ Tango: Cashing in on Buenos Aires’ Privatization, 
Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=50#. 
 74. Logan, supra note 8. 
 75. See Grogg, supra note 37. But cf. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 7 (ob-
serving that it is public authorities, and not private multinationals, that supply the under-
served regions comprising the 1.1 billion people who still lack access to water, and the 
2.4 billion who lack sanitation). 
 76. See, e.g., Jacques Pauw, Metered to Death: How a Water Experiment Caused 
Riots and a Cholera Epidemic, Feb. 5, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report. 
aspx?aid=49. The total cost recovery principle adopted in South Africa has led to ten 
million South Africans having their access to water cut off for various periods between 
1994 and 2002, while two million had been evicted from their homes because of not be-
ing able to pay their utility bills. Id. According to South Africa’s Human Sciences Re-
search Council, the cutoffs forced poor people to obtain water from polluted streams and 
rivers, directly causing an outbreak of cholera. Id. See also Logan, supra note 8. Cf. 
Soweto Residents Protest Against Water Meters, S. AFR. PRESS ASS’N, Sept. 15, 2004 
(recounting reports of people refraining from flushing their toilets until they had been 
used several times, and storing dirty water for flushing, because the government’s free 
allocation of the first 6000 liters was insufficient). 
 77. The Philippine government privatized the publicly owned Metropolitan Water-
works and Sewerage System in 1997, at the advice of the World Bank. Marites Sison, 
Philippines: Awash in Water Bills After Privatization, INTER PRESS SERV., Jan. 22, 2003. 
Manila Water, a partnership between the International Water Consortium and a Philip-
pine oligarch family was awarded the concession for the East Zone area, while Maynilad 
Water Services, a partnership between Lyonnaise des Eaux and another Philippine family 
runs the West Zone area. Id. 
 78. Macan-Markar, supra note 68. Manila residents served by Maynilad were paying 
30 cents per cubic meter of water in 2002, which constitutes a 76 percent increase from 
the pre-privatization price four years earlier. Sison, supra note 77. 
 79. In 2002, Maynilad terminated its 25-year concession after the government failed 
to approve further rate increases. Diana Mendoza, Politics: Water Woes of Poor a Key 
Issue in Pilipino Election, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 26, 2004, available at Westlaw: 
3/26/04 INTERPS. In 2004, the Philippine government agreed to cancel $142 million of 
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tors, the Philippine experience with water privatization shows that priva-
tization does not automatically improve efficiency, and disregards the 
economic and social costs to citizens in favor of generating profits and 
cost-recovery for multinational water companies.80 
Critics also highlight the power disparity between developing countries 
and powerful multinational companies.81 Multinational companies are 
protected by multilateral trade agreements from termination of their con-
tracts and may seek compensation.82 The costs of compensation would be 
prohibitively expensive for governments seeking to terminate contracts 
detrimental to the needs of their citizenry.83 On the other hand, compa-
nies may often coerce governments into renegotiating contracts because 
contract cancellation adversely affects countries’ abilities to attract for-
eign investment.84 The power disparity between multinational water 
companies and the governments of developing countries often results in 
closed-door negotiations with little input by citizens, which has been 
seen as contributing to a climate of corruption and bribery.85 In some 
                                                                                                             
unpaid concession fees and to convert them into government-held shares, which 
prompted opponents in the presidential campaign to call the government action a “bail-
out” and a “scandalous deal.” Id. 
 80. Sison, supra note 77. 
 81. See Kothari, supra note 39. 
 82. See id. For example, Aguas del Tunari, the concessionaire in Cochabamba, Bo-
livia brought a proceeding against Bolivia before the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and invoked a bilateral investment treaty between the 
Netherlands and Bolivia as the basis for jurisdiction. Aguas del Tunari v. Republic of 
Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, 
para. 4 (Oct. 21, 2005), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/AdT_Decision-en.pdf. The 
arbitration tribunal rejected Bolivia’s objections to jurisdiction, with one dissent. Id. 
paras. 334–37. No decision on the merits had been reached before the publication of this 
Note. 
 83. Kothari, supra note 39. 
 84. For example, the two multinational concessionaires providing water in Manila 
asked the Philippine government in 2001 to amend their contracts to allow them to set 
rates without going through the state regulatory agency, and to lower or postpone their 
performance targets. Sison, supra note 77. According to one NGO spokesman comment-
ing on the situation in the Philippines, “street-smart companies [may be] making unrealis-
tic and unsustainable bids just to win the tender, and gambling on the possibility that the 
rules of the game could change later in their favor, given the weakness of regulation in 
the country . . . .”  Id. 
 85. Kothari, supra note 39 (noting that negotiations behind closed doors have encour-
aged bribery and pointing to the convictions of Suez and Vivendi in France for paying 
bribes to obtain water concessions). See also Sylvestre Tetchiada, Development—
Cameroon: Water Projects Plagued by Corruption, May 18, 2004, available at Westlaw: 
5/18/04 INTERPS (recounting accusations against Cameroonian officials for demanding 
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instances, multinational companies have also cooperated with authoritar-
ian regimes.86 
In light of the problems plaguing privatization, opponents have called 
on the international community to put its resources into reforming the 
public sector of developing countries. Activists argue that international 
assistance confers de facto subsidies to private companies,87 and point 
out that in many cases water companies invest very little of their own 
capital,88 relying instead on loans from the World Bank and other finan-
cial institutions.89 For instance, transnational civil society groups com-
menting on the EU proposal for improving water access and sanitation in 
underdeveloped countries critiqued the proposal for assuming, without 
evidence, “that the role of the private water industry needs to be ex-
panded.”90 
Instead, these groups have called on the European Union to use its 
funds to strengthen management skills in the public sector in poor coun-
tries, and to help upgrade publicly-run water.91 Under this view, public 
management fosters local and community-based participatory decision-
making. Community participation is better suited to respond to local 
needs than big privatization agendas, which force-feed the same policies 
on developing nations.92 Some have also pointed to the successes of wa-
ter delivery run by public bodies.93 The public water system in Phnom 
Phen, Cambodia has increased tap-water delivery from 25 percent of 
                                                                                                             
payoffs in connection with a project to supply water to the Cameroonian capital, 
Yaounde). 
 86. See, e.g., Harsono, supra note 73 (discussing the relationships between the Su-
harto regime in Indonesia and the global multinationals Thames and Suez, which ob-
tained concessions without public bidding). See also John Burton, Malaysia to Spend 
Dollars 13bn on Overhaul of Water, Sewage Services, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, avail-
able at 2004 WLNR 9779449 (reporting on possible renegotiations of concessions 
granted to multinational companies under the regime of Mahatir Mohamad behind closed 
doors and without competitive bidding). 
 87. See Bianchi, supra note 28. 
 88. Logan, supra note 8. 
 89. See, e.g., Santoro, supra note 73 (observing that Aguas Argentinas obtained at 
least 75 percent of its investment in Buenos Aires’s water system from the World Bank 
and similar international financial institutions). 
 90. Bianchi, supra note 28. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Marwaan Macan-Markar, Declaration on Water Lacks Clear Programme of 
Action, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 23, 2003. 
 93. See Kothari, supra note 39 (asserting that public enterprises operate “some of the 
best practices found in water and sanitation provision”). 
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homes in 1993, to 80 percent by the end of 2002.94 Similarly, Bogotá’s 
publicly managed Water and Sewage Company has risen out of practical 
bankruptcy in 1993 and transformed itself into the most respected utility 
in Colombia.95 
Critics also contend that market-based arguments about efficiency and 
pricing according to the laws of supply and demand are misplaced, in 
light of the fact that water is a public good,96 as well as a natural monop-
oly.97 The concept of markets for water belies the fact that water con-
sumers cannot choose the best or lowest-priced provider amongst 
many.98 Pricing of water is principally an administrative decision.99 
Finally, from a human rights perspective, the acceleration of privatiza-
tion has been seen to constitute essentially a privatization of human 
rights, including the human right to water.100 Privatization of rights re-
sults in their erosion and, in particular, leads to violations of the rights of 
                                                                                                             
 94. Macan-Markar, supra note 68 (noting, however, that the city’s poor still paid only 
a fraction less than what they used to pay to private vendors). See also Kothari, supra 
note 39 (pointing to the successes of public enterprises in São Paulo, Brazil; Debrecen, 
Hungary; Lilongwe, Malawi; and Tegucigalpa, Honduras). 
 95. Ronderos, supra note 13. Bogotá has refused to privatize its utility despite re-
peated pressure by the World Bank. Id. In eight years, the company reduced by half the 
number of households without sanitation, and by 75 percent the number of households 
without water. Id. 
 96. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: 
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317 (2000). A 
“public good” is characterized by “indivisibility,” which means that it cannot be divided 
up so that some consumers would buy more of it, while others would be excluded, and 
“publicness,” which means that “it is impossible to keep others from accessing and enjoy-
ing the good so long as it is accessible and enjoyable by anyone.”  Id. at 330.  While Del-
lapenna concedes that water is not physically indivisible and public in a strict sense, he 
argues that it should be treated as such considering its economic and social characteris-
tics. Id. at 331–36. 
 97. The concept “natural monopoly” has been traced to a 1670 treatise, De Portibus 
Maris, in which England’s Lord Chief Justice defended governmental regulation of sea-
ports on the principle that they were “affected with a public interest.”  See Joseph P. To-
main, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 242, 243 
(2002). Tomain defines “natural monopoly” as the idea that a single supplier will provide 
services at a lower cost by realizing economies of scale. Id. at 242. The usual solution to 
natural monopolies, however, has been not public ownership, but rather the so-called 
“regulatory compact” between the state and a private utility, under which “a monopoly on 
service in a particular geographical area . . . is granted to the utility in exchange for a 
regime of intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market    
. . . .”  Id. at 243 (quoting Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 98. Dellapenna, supra note 96, at 321–23. 
 99. Id. at 323. 
 100. Kothari, supra note 39. 
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the poor.101 As argued below, holding private water companies liable for 
the human right to water may present one avenue for preempting such 
violations. 
III. WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
A. Historical Development of the Human Right to Water 
The human right to water has been inferred recently and has since then 
been relatively contested. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
does not expressly mention a human right to water.102 The two funda-
mental human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), also do not explicitly refer to a 
right to water.103 The only express references to a right to water in human 
rights treaties are in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women,104 and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.105 International humanitarian law106 also contains specific pro-
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. (contending that “corporate globalisation, and its clear expression of privatisa-
tion of services, is one of the greatest threats to universal access to clean drinking water 
and sanitation” because it reduces accountability to the public and undermines services to 
the poor by emphasized profits and cost recovery). But see infra notes 204–05 and ac-
companying text. 
 102. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Neither 
was the issue discussed during the Universal Declaration’s drafting. ROTHFEDER, supra 
note 12, at 79. 
 103. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 104. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women art. 14(2), opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 
(1980) (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to . . . ensure to [women in 
rural areas] the right . . . (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation 
to . . . water supply . . . .”). 
 105. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24(2)(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
44, 30 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) (requiring state parties “to combat disease and malnutrition . . . 
through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean-drinking water . . . .”). 
 106. International humanitarian law refers to the body of law applicable in armed con-
flict. See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
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visions about the right to water.107 In addition, the human right to water 
has been enshrined in several national constitutions.108 
In 2002, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ESCR Committee) issued Comment 15 addressing specifically the hu-
man right to water.109 In the aftermath of Comment 15, references to the 
human right to water appeared in multiple reports of the United Nations 
and other entities,110 and in the official remarks of world leaders.111 
However, a declaration of government ministers adopted at the Third 
World Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003 notably lacked language recogniz-
ing the right to water as a human right,112 indicating a lack of interna-
tional consensus on the issue.113 
                                                                                                             
tion III]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 107. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 106, arts. 20, 26 (providing that the 
detaining power shall provide sufficient drinking water to prisoners of war). 
 108. For example, the Constitution of South Africa explicitly recognizes a right to 
water: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to 
. . . . 
(b) sufficient food and water; 
. . . . 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights. 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 27. The passing of a constitutional amendment recognizing 
water as a human right in Uruguay in 2004 provides another example. See supra note 14 
and accompanying text. 
 109. See generally General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Comm. 
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereinafter 
Comment 15]. 
 110. See, e.g., THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17. 
 111. For example, at the Third World Water Forum in 2003, French President Jacques 
Chirac stated in a video presentation that “water should be recognized as a human right.”  
Marwaan Macan-Markar, Egypt Urges Programs Not Promises in Blue Revolution, 
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 16, 2003. See also THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 6 
(quoting remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan that “access to safe 
water is a fundamental human need and, therefore, a basic human right”). 
 112. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51, para. 1 (stating, instead, that “water is 
a driving force for sustainable development including environmental integrity, and the 
eradication of poverty and hunger, indispensable for human health and welfare”); Macan-
Markar, supra note 92. The Ministerial Declaration as well the organizers of the World 
Water Forum have been criticized for sidestepping the United Nations, and seeking to 
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B. Scope and Legal Basis of the Human Right to Water 
Although the ICESCR does not refer explicitly to a right to water, the 
ESCR Committee has stated that a right to water is implicit in other 
enumerated rights in the ICESCR. Specifically, the ESCR Committee 
has declared that the right to water is implicit within the right to an ade-
quate standard of living under article 11(1) of the ICESCR because it 
“clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an 
adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fun-
damental conditions for survival.”114 Furthermore, the ESCR Committee 
has stated that the right to water is “inextricably related” to the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health under article 12(1)115 and the 
rights to adequate housing and adequate food under article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR.116 Finally, the right to water “should be seen in conjunction 
with other rights enshrined in the International Bill on Human Rights, 
foremost among them the right to life and human dignity.”117 In view of 
the aspirational articulation of the guarantees of the ICESCR, grounding 
the right to water in this covenant has distinct implications on what kind 
of responsibilities are conferred on state and non-state actors.118 
Some scholars have pointed to customary international law as a basis 
for the right to water.119 According to this argument, states have engaged 
                                                                                                             
bestow international legitimacy on what critics view as a privatization agenda through a 
ministerial meeting. See Marwaan Macan-Markar, Critics Accuse Water Forum of Side-
stepping U.N., INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 20, 2003. 
 113. See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 85–90 (reviewing debates at other international 
conferences regarding the question whether water should be viewed as a legal right or a 
need). 
 114. General Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 3. 
 115. See also THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that the human right to 
the highest attainable standard of health encompasses the “underlying determinants of 
health,” including safe water and adequate sanitation). 
 116. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 3. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Adequate Housing has stated that “without access to potable water the right to adequate 
housing loses its meaning.”  Kothari, supra note 39. 
 117. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 3. 
 118. Earlier commentators on the right to water writing before Comment 15 have ex-
plored the argument that the right to water should be seen as implicit within the right to 
life under article 6(1) of the ICCPR. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Wa-
ter: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9–12 
(1992). 
 119. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1727–28. Cf. McCaffrey, supra 
note 118, at 8 (exploring, but ultimately rejecting an argument that a right to water could 
be binding as customary law if read into the right to an adequate standard of living under 
the Universal Declaration because it is not clear that so-called “welfare rights” under the 
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in a consistent practice of ensuring water provision for their citizens.120 
Secondly, the numerous world conferences and summits that have recog-
nized water as a human right may be seen as indicating opinio juris, that 
is, belief by states that they have a legal obligation to ensure access to 
clean and affordable water.121 
The right to water, as elaborated in Comment 15, encompasses both 
substantive and procedural components. The substantive components 
comprise availability, quality, and accessibility, including the principle 
that “water, and water facilities and services, must be affordable for 
all.”122 The procedural components consist of the right to information 
concerning water issues, the right to participate, and the right to effective 
remedies.123 
Comment 15 provides for general and specific obligations on state par-
ties.124 Notwithstanding article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which provides for a 
progressive achievement of rights recognized under the covenant,125 the 
ESCR Committee has stated that state parties have some “immediate ob-
ligations” in relation to the right of water, “such as the guarantee that the 
right will be exercised without discrimination of any kind . . . and the 
obligation to take steps . . . toward the full realization of [the rights to an 
adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of 
                                                                                                             
Declaration constitute binding customary law). The concept of “welfare” rights is dis-
cussed below. See infra Part III.C. 
 120. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1728 n.295. 
 121. Id. The authors recognize, however, the obstacles to this argument evident in such 
documents as the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Principle 
No. 4, which designates that water should be recognized as an economic good. Id. 
 122. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 12. 
 123. Id. para.12(c)(iv) (“[A]ccessibility includes the right to seek, receive and impart 
information concerning water issues.”); id. para. 48 (“The right of individuals and groups 
to participate in decision-making processes that may affect their exercise of the right to 
water must be an integral part of any policy, programme or strategy concerning water. 
Individuals and groups should be given full and equal access to information concerning 
water . . . held by public authorities or third parties.”); id. para. 55 (“Any persons or 
groups who have been denied their right to water should have access to effective judicial 
or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels.”). See also 
Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1675. 
 124. See Comment 15, supra note 109, paras. 17–38. 
 125. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides: “Each state party  . . . undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially eco-
nomic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized  . . . by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”  ICESCR, supra note 103, 
art. 2(1). 
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health].”126 Furthermore, Comment 15 provides for a “constant and con-
tinuing duty” on states “to move as expeditiously and effectively as pos-
sible towards the full realization of the right to water.”127 Finally, it in-
troduces a “strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in rela-
tion to the right to water are prohibited . . . .”128 
Comment 15 divides the specific obligations of states into three cate-
gories. First, “obligations to respect” essentially impose a negative duty 
on states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to 
water.129 Second, “obligations to protect” impose affirmative duties on 
states to prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the 
right to water.130 Third, “obligations to fulfill” require states to adopt a 
variety of measures empowering individuals and groups to exercise their 
right to water.131 Finally, Comment 15 introduces the concept of “core 
obligations,” which include the obligation to “ensure access to the mini-
mum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal 
and domestic uses to prevent disease.”132 
With respect to non-state actors, states’ obligations to protect encom-
pass safeguards against the actions of corporations operating water facili-
ties.133 In particular, “where water services . . . are operated or controlled 
by third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising 
equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable 
water.”134 Furthermore, Comment 15 explicitly provides that “arbitrary 
or unjustified disconnection from water services or facilities,” and “dis-
criminatory or unaffordable increases in the price of water” constitute 
prima facie violations of states’ obligation to respect the right to water.135 
These protections are directly relevant to potential violations that might 
arise from water privatization. As discussed below, however, safeguard-
ing the human right to water from the potential violations by privatized 
water utilities through the mechanism of state responsibility may be in-
                                                                                                             
 126. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 17. For an earlier discussion of the legal bases 
of a right to water and an argument that the right to water should be “an immediate obli-
gation” of the state party encompassing a positive duty to supply safe water sufficient to 
sustain life, see McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 13. 
 127. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 18. 
 128. Id. para. 19. 
 129. Id. paras. 21–22. 
 130. Id. paras. 23–24. 
 131. Id. paras. 25–29 (further dividing the obligations to fulfill into obligations to fa-
cilitate, promote and provide). 
 132. Id. para. 37. 
 133. Id. paras. 23–24. 
 134. Id. para. 24. 
 135. Id. para. 44(a). 
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adequate in light of the power differential between multinational water 
companies and the governments of developing countries. Governments 
of developing countries may be weak, corrupt, or fearful of detracting 
foreign investment.136 It is therefore necessary to elaborate and support 
the legal mechanisms for holding private water providers directly liable 
for infringing the human right to water. 
C. Objections to the Right to Water 
The right to water and its proper legal basis has aroused some contro-
versy. In the view of two U.S. scholars, Michael J. Dennis and David P. 
Stewart, “the derivation of a separate right to water is virtually without 
precedent.”137 They see the inference of a right to water from the provi-
sions of the ICESCR as part of a larger revisionist program by the ESCR 
Committee.138 In their view, the Committee has unduly rewritten provi-
sions of the ICESCR and expanded the liability of state parties in a way 
neither borne out by the text of the covenant, nor by the history of its 
negotiation.139 
In particular, Dennis and Stewart direct the brunt of their critique at the 
pronouncements made by the ESCR Committee concerning the affirma-
tive duties on states to “fulfill” the rights provided for by the ICESCR, 
and the idea that states have immediately applicable core obligations—
from which no derogation is permitted—to provide “minimum essential 
levels” of the rights to water, housing, food, and health.140 These inter-
pretations of the ICESCR articulate “unmistakably mandatory” obliga-
tions that, according to the authors, directly conflict with the aspirational 
and progressive nature of state obligations as articulated by article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR and evident in the treaty’s negotiating history.141 
In addition, Dennis and Stewart object to some of the implementation 
procedures provided for by Comment 15, in particular the requirement 
that states adopt a national water strategy to be reviewed for compliance 
with the ICESCR requirements.142 Subjecting the distribution and priori-
ties of state resources to judicial determination would inappropriately 
result in judicial second-guessing of what are essentially legislative deci-
                                                                                                             
 136. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate 
the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 494 (2004). 
 138. Id. at 491–500. 
 139. Id. at 494. 
 140. Id. at 491–92. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 497. 
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sions of sovereign governments.143 Judicial determinations are especially 
inappropriate in the context of scarce resources because they would sub-
ject governments to liability for mere bad luck.144 
This skepticism regarding the legal basis of, inter alia, the right to wa-
ter and, consequently, its normative content and implementation proce-
dures, stems from the larger jurisprudential and political debates regard-
ing the differences between the so-called “liberty rights” under the 
ICCPR, and the so-called “welfare rights” under the ICESCR.145 Liberty 
rights have been traditionally understood as negative rights, requiring the 
state merely to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of such 
rights.146 Welfare rights, on the other hand, require positive state action 
and significant expenditure of state resources.147 This dichotomy has 
been challenged, however, as misplaced and reflective of the ideology of 
the Cold War era.148 A closer examination reveals that liberty rights are 
not absolutely dissimilar from welfare rights in two respects. Liberty 
rights impose affirmative duties on state parties to organize governmen-
tal institutions—such as a legislature and a judiciary—that would ensure 
the rights’ realization, which requires spending resources.149 Second, lib-
erty rights have been interpreted to require affirmative steps by states to 
ensure the protection of rights from private infringement by third par-
ties.150 Moreover, at a conceptual level, the privileging of negative “liber-
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. at 498 (“Who is to say when a government has spent enough money to ensure 
a complaining individual’s highest attainable standard of physical or mental health?”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 463–64 (“In light of Article 2(1) [of the ICESCR], can it cogently be 
argued that the ICESCR articulates real rights, or does it merely set forth hortatory goals, 
programmatic objectives, or utopian ideals?”). 
 146. McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 14–15 (explaining and critiquing this assumption 
as misplaced). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Amnesty International, The UN Human Rights Norms for Business: Towards 
Legal Accountability, at 10, AI Index 0-86210-350-9 (2004), available at http://web. 
amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/IOR420022004ENGLISH/$File/IOR4200204.pdf 
(observing that when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was elaborated into 
treaty form, the two treaties were split as a result of the “ideological divisions of the Cold 
War,” and that after the Cold War, “it again became possible to view human rights obli-
gations as interdependent”). Cf. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human 
Rights?, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 125, 135 (1999) (observing that during the 1980s the US 
rejected economic, social and cultural rights “in part as an element of larger Cold War 
strategies”). 
 149. McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 15; Dunoff, supra note 148, at 129. 
 150. Dunoff, supra note 152, at 129. 
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ties” over economic needs has been forcefully critiqued by Amartya Sen 
as rooted in an unduly narrow concept of freedom and justice.151 
Concededly, even if the distinction between liberty and welfare rights 
is viewed as untenable, one still has to grapple with a textual difference 
in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Whereas the ICCPR binds state parties to 
an “immediate obligation” to respect and ensure the proclaimed rights,152 
the ICESCR only obligates a state party to take steps “to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the . . . Covenant . . . .”153 This dif-
ference between the ICESCR and the ICCPR lends support to the view 
that the ICESCR sought to articulate “aspirational” goals rather than en-
forceable and justiciable state obligations. Because of their aspirational 
nature, the argument goes, economic, social, and cultural rights are diffi-
cult to implement through judicial mechanisms. 
In response, some have pointed out that some of the rights under the 
ICESCR, including the right to water, are so fundamental as to require 
immediate, rather than progressive obligations on state parties.154 Fur-
thermore, the inference of immediately applicable core obligations to 
provide minimum essential levels of water may be seen as consistent 
with the obligation of good faith compliance with treaties.155 Immediate 
obligations with respect to the right to water would not be unduly bur-
densome, insofar as they incorporate a “due diligence”156 standard suffi-
                                                                                                             
 151. Sen traces the precedence of “liberty” over economic needs to John Rawls’ theory 
of justice, and libertarian variants of that theory, as exemplified in the work of Robert 
Nozick. See SEN, supra note 3, at 63–67. Instead, Sen proposes a “capability” oriented 
approach to justice, which emphasizes a person’s freedom to choose a life she values. Id. 
at 74. Sen defines “capability” as “the substantive freedom to achieve alternative func-
tioning combinations,” where functioning “reflects the various things a person may value 
doing or being,” ranging from basic sustenance to participating in communal life. Id. at 
75. Thus, within the capability framework, both “liberty” and economic and social needs 
are theoretically accorded equal importance. 
 152. See ICCPR, supra note 103, art. 2. 
 153. ICESCR, supra note 103, art. 2(1). 
 154. See McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 13. See also Comment 15, supra note 109, 
para. 1 (stating that the human right to water “is indispensable for leading a life in human 
dignity” as well as “a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights”); Amnesty 
International, supra note 148, at 10 (“Without protecting basic subsistence rights (such as 
food, water or shelter), it is difficult to exercise civil and political rights (such as free 
speech, fair trials or electoral participation).”). 
 155. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 79 (1969). 
 156. It should be noted that human rights law does not indicate what the standard of 
care should be with respect to the right to water. See Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra 
note 12, at 1730. It has been argued, however, that strict liability would be undesirable 
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ciently elastic to take into account the capabilities of the particular 
state.157 
With respect to the alleged difficulty of judicial determination of viola-
tions of the right to water, it should be attributed to the absence of na-
tional or international caselaw, rather than to some inherent non-
justiciability of economic, social, and cultural rights.158 Therefore, em-
powering the ESCR Committee to hear individual cases would allow it to 
elucidate the standard of care applicable to violations of the right to wa-
ter.159 Furthermore, attention should be focused on the procedural rights 
attendant to the right to water because violations of procedural rights 
lend themselves more readily to easy identification and monitoring.160 
Finally, regarding the argument that judicial adjudication of the human 
right to water encroaches on what are essentially legislative decisions 
about distribution of state resources, one might argue that Dennis and 
Stewart are unduly formalistic. Judicial bodies have always engaged in 
the balancing of resources, to the extent that such balancing is implicit in 
protecting the minimum of rights that states and legislatures may not 
transgress. 
IV. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Justification of Corporate Liability for Violations of International 
Human Rights 
Corporate activities have been brought into the ambit of international 
human rights law only recently. Historically, the human rights regime 
emerged to protect the rights of individuals from abuse by their govern-
ments; therefore, states have the principal duty to enforce international 
human rights law.161 Although the development of international criminal 
law had focused international attention on the human rights responsibili-
                                                                                                             
for state acts or omissions that do not give rise to liability under ordinary tort principles 
and that a negligence standard would be more appropriate. Id. 
 157. See McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 13. 
 158. See Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1672 n.20 (“The lack of na-
tional case law directly related to economic, social, and cultural rights has itself perpetu-
ated the idea that those rights are not capable of judicial enforcement.” (quoting 
MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 10 (1995))). 
 159. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1791. 
 160. Id. at 1794. 
 161. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 465–66 (2001). 
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ties of individual non-state actors, attention to the human rights viola-
tions by corporations had remained scant until recently.162 
The case for corporate liability for violations of international human 
rights remains controversial.163 The omission of private actors from the 
purview of international human rights law reflects the broader notion that 
only actions by states constitute the proper subject matter of international 
law, whereas violations by private actors fall within the purview of do-
mestic laws.164 Holding corporations liable for violations of international 
human rights departs from this traditional doctrine. The departure has 
been justified on the ground that the increasing economic165 and political 
influence of corporations166 in a globalized market requires that corpora-
tions comply with human rights.167 Governments, especially those of un-
developed and developing countries, may be reluctant to regulate corpo-
rate activities for fear of discouraging foreign investments.168 In addition, 
                                                                                                             
 162. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003). 
 163. See generally Ratner, supra note 161 (describing the jurisprudential debates sur-
rounding corporate liability for human rights, and making the case that corporate liability 
is desirable and justified). 
 164. Id. at 466. 
 165. In 2000, the production output of transnational corporations amounted to one 
fourth of the world’s total output, and 5 percent more of the output of all developing 
countries combined. Ann Marie Erb-Leoncavallo, The Road From Seattle, 37 UN 
CHRON., Jan. 1, 2000, at 2831. The direct investments of transnational corporations in 
developing countries have surpassed official aid and net lending by international banks. 
Id. 
 166. See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
ness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, pmbl., U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 
(2003) [hereinafter Norms] (noting that global trends have greatly increased the influence 
of transnational corporations and that these entities have both “the capacity to foster eco-
nomic well-being” as well as to “cause harmful impacts on the human rights and lives of 
individuals”). See also Amnesty International, Submission by Amnesty International un-
der Decision 2004/116 on the “Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Re-
lated Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”, AI Index: POL 34/006/2004, 
Sept. 29, 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engpol340062004 (noting that com-
panies exercise “tremendous influence and power” and that government regulation may 
be inadequate in many countries to protect individuals from adverse corporate actions). 
 167. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 901 (“[W]ith power should come re-
sponsibility. . . .” (quoting Mary Robinson, U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Second 
Global Ethic Lecture: Human Rights, Ethics and Globalisation, University of Tübingen, 
Germany (Jan. 21, 2002), http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/special/2002/robinson)). 
 168. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next 
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 392–93 (2005); Ratner, supra note 161, at 462. 
Ratner describes the historical shifts of power between governments and companies as a 
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the global operations of corporations in multiple countries have made 
them more independent of government control169 and outside the reach of 
any single government.170 
B. The Evolution of Corporate Responsibility: From Voluntary Codes 
Towards Binding Norms 
The first initiatives for corporate accountability for international hu-
man rights violations consisted of voluntary codes of conduct.171 The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is-
sued Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) in 
1976, applicable to enterprises operating in OECD member countries and 
eight non-members.172 The OECD Guidelines provide that enterprises 
should “respect the human rights of those affected by their activities con-
sistent with the host government’s international obligations and com-
mitments.”173 Although the OECD Guidelines are not legally enforce-
able, but rather voluntary and aspirational,174 they do, nevertheless, pro-
vide for a monitoring apparatus consisting of National Contact Points set 
                                                                                                             
“swinging pendulum.”  In the colonial period, the system of “concessions” vested power 
in the colonial metropolises, which supported the exploitation of the colonies by the big 
European companies such as British East India. The period of decolonization saw expro-
priations of foreign investment by newly decolonized states, and the first efforts by host 
states to draft a multinational code of conduct for transnational corporations. The empha-
sis on host state rights gave way, at the end of the Cold War, to yet another shift in favor 
of the rights of transnational corporations, manifested in bilateral treaties between home 
states and host states, and free trade agreements. Id. at 452–60. For a discussion of the 
implications of bilateral investment treaties on state protections of human rights, see 
Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement 
and Realization (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/documents/GLWP 
0105Suda.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) (noting that expropriation provisions in bilateral 
investment treaties may preclude states from regulating human rights, and outlining a 
hypothetical human rights defense to an arbitration brought by an investor for alleged 
expropriation). 
 169. Ratner, supra note 161, at 463. 
 170. See Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 5. 
 171. One of the earliest and best known voluntary codes of conduct, the “Sullivan 
Principles,” was elaborated for transnational corporations operating in South Africa dur-
ing apartheid. See Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, 
24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985). For an overview of the various initiatives for developing corpo-
rate codes of conduct, including a brief review of the Sullivan Principles, see Murphy, 
supra note 168, at 403–20. 
 172. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development, OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/192 
2428.pdf (revised 2000). 
 173. Id. at 19. 
 174. Id. at 17. 
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up by adhering states and an overseeing Investment Committee.175 The 
main critique of the OECD Guidelines concerns their implementation. 
Their monitoring mechanism has been viewed as inadequate because its 
bodies lack investigative or remedial powers and are susceptible to abuse 
because state officials may refrain from actions that would alienate busi-
ness from the economic interests of their government.176 Secondly, it has 
been argued that the human rights provision in the OECD Guidelines is 
too general to provide meaningful guidance for companies.177 
In January 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan articu-
lated nine principles for corporate responsibility at the World Economic 
Forum.178 With the addition of a tenth principle against corruption in 
2004, these principles have come to be known as the Global Compact.179 
With respect to human rights, the Global Compact articulates two princi-
ples: (1) “Businesses should support and respect the protection of inter-
nationally proclaimed human rights;” and (2) “make sure that they are 
not complicit in human rights abuses.”180 The inclusion of a pledge to 
support human rights and to avoid complicity with human rights viola-
tions reflects an expansion of the role of business enterprises regarding 
human rights over and above that implicit in the OECD Guidelines, 
which provided only that business enterprises should “respect” human 
rights. Companies may participate in the Global Compact by sending a 
letter to the Secretary-General, followed by a change in corporate opera-
tions “so that the Global Compact and its principles become part of strat-
egy, culture and day-to-day operations” of the company.181 Still, the 
Global Compact has been criticized for being too general, for failing to 
encourage companies to consider best practices compliant with the prin-
                                                                                                             
 175. Id. at 32, 35–37. 
 176. See Amnesty International, supra note 162 (expressing concern that government 
officials may be too close to business interests, potentially allowing the government’s 
economic interest to influence its consideration of corporate behavior). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland (Jan. 31, 1999), U.N. Doc. SG/SM.6448. 
 179. The ten principles forming the Global Compact and other initiatives under the 
same umbrella are available at United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobal 
compact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
 180. Id. 
 181. United Nations Global Compact, How to Participate in the Global Compact, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2006). 
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ciples, and for lacking any oversight mechanisms or means to contest the 
participation of companies that fail to abide by its principles.182 
Responding to increased international scrutiny of corporate activities, 
many companies have adopted voluntary internal codes of conduct.183 
Although around 1,000 internal company codes have been estimated to 
exist,184 according to Amnesty International, fewer than fifty make ex-
plicit references to human rights.185 The shortcomings of voluntary 
schemes in ensuring that corporations abide by human rights norms have 
led to deliberations of binding measures. 
C. The Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises 
In 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights adopted a landmark instrument of corporate 
human rights obligations, the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights (Norms).186 The Norms have been written as the first 
                                                                                                             
 182. Amnesty International, supra note 166. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 413. It 
should be also pointed out that a search of the Global Compact participant database re-
veals only 889 business participants worldwide. United Nations Global Compact, COP 
Search Results, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/cop_ search. 
html?reset=1(click “Business participants only”; then click “Search”) (last visited Jan. 8, 
2006). 
 183. For a discussion of the rise of corporate codes of conduct, see Fiona McLeay, 
Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations—A Small Piece of a Large Puzzle (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/ 
workingpapers/documents/GLWP0105McLeay.pdf. For a discussion of corporate re-
sponses to international scrutiny from a legal-sociological standpoint, especially in the 
wake of human rights claims against corporate actors under the Alien Torts Claims Act, 
see generally Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Torts Claims Act: 
On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635 
(2004). Shamir argues that companies have responded with a twofold strategy. The first 
part of companies’ strategy is to undermine the identity and motives of Western public 
interest lawyers who bring the cases, and the second part consists of the adoption of in-
ternal voluntary codes. The adoption of voluntary codes allows companies to “stabilize” 
the meaning of the concept “social responsibility” around voluntary, rather than binding, 
schemes. Id. at 660. As the author puts it, “corporate voluntarism has become . . . a cru-
cial frontline in the struggle over meaning and an essential ideological locus for dissemi-
nating the neoliberal logic of altruistic social participation that is to be governed by 
goodwill alone.”  Id. For an example of a voluntary code of a multinational water com-
pany, see RWE, RWE CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.rwe.com/generator.aspx/property= 
Data/id=266710/en-download.pdf. 
 184. McLeay, supra note 183, at 7. 
 185. Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 5. 
 186. See generally Norms, supra note 166. 
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non-voluntary scheme for international corporate accountability for hu-
man rights abuses.187 Their legal authority has been hotly contested. The 
Norms’ principal drafter argues that “[t]he legal authority of the Norms 
derives principally from their sources in treaties and customary interna-
tional law, as a restatement of international legal principles applicable to 
companies.”188 Critics have disputed this characterization, charging that 
the Norms “are presented as a set of norms or standards when in fact 
many of the instruments from which they are drawn are not themselves 
legally binding and those that are heavily qualify the rights they are sup-
posed to address.”189 While the Norms have been overwhelmingly sup-
ported by international human rights organizations and civil society rep-
resentatives in numerous countries,190 multiple business associations 
                                                                                                             
 187. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 903. See also Amnesty International, 
supra note 148, at 6–7 (noting that the Norms are “self-consciously normative,” and lack 
clauses characteristic of voluntary schemes that would highlight their non-regulatory 
character). In April 2004, however, the Commission on Human rights issued a decision, 
in which it “affirm[ed] that [the Norms] has not been requested by the Commission and, 
as a draft proposal, has no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not per-
form any monitoring function in this regard.”  Report of the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 60th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.73/Rev.1 (Apr. 16, 2004). 
 188. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 913; Amnesty International, supra note 
148, at 7 (“All of the substantive human rights provisions in the UN Norms are drawn 
from existing international law and standards. The novelty or the UN Norms is to apply 
these . . . to private enterprises, but even in doing so to draw on a wide range of interna-
tional practice . . . .”). See also Norms, supra note 166, pmbl. (recalling that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is addressed to every organ of society, including transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises). Weissbrodt and Kruger concede that 
there is no consensus on the place of businesses within the international legal order as of 
yet that would make possible the Norms’ incorporation into treaties as “hard law,” but 
argue that the further refinement and implementation of the Norms by higher bodies in 
the United Nations will develop their binding nature. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 
162, at 913–15. See also Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 6 (“The process lead-
ing to the UN Norms is similar to that resulting in other ‘soft law’ standards, some of 
which are now seen as part of customary international law.”). 
 189. Timothy E. Deal, Senior Vice President, U.S. Council for International Business, 
Statement to the Fund for Peace, Human Rights and Business Roundtable: Business and 
Human Rights; The Proposed Norms on the Responsibilities of Business Regarding Hu-
man Rights (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=2823. 
 190. See Amnesty International, Statement of Support for the UN Human Rights 
Norms for Business delivered at the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights 
15 March–23 April 2004, Geneva, AI Index: IOR 42/005/2004, http://web.amnesty. 
org/pages/ec-unnorms_4-eng (the statement has been signed by nearly 200 NGOs and 
175 individuals including members of the European Parliament). 
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have criticized the Norms rigorously, principally on the ground that they 
shift human rights obligations from governments to private actors.191 
Reflecting this tension, the future of the Norms remains uncertain.192 
At its session in April 2005, the United Nations Commission for Human 
Rights refrained from endorsing the Norms. Instead, it requested that the 
Secretary-General appoint a special representative for a period of two 
years, with a mandate to clarify further the standards of corporate ac-
countability, and decided to continue consideration of the question at its 
next session.193 
Under the Norms, transnational corporations have the general obliga-
tion to “promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of, and 
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law” 
within their spheres of activity and influence.194 This obligation embraces 
a standard of “due diligence” that companies’ activities “do not contrib-
ute directly or indirectly to human abuses” or “benefit from abuses of 
which they were aware or ought to have been aware.”195 In relevant part, 
the Norms obligate corporations specifically to “respect economic, social 
                                                                                                             
 191. See, e.g., Deal, supra note 189; International Chamber of Commerce [ICC] & 
International Organization of Employers [IOC], Joint Views of the ICC and IOE on the 
Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 (July 
24, 2003). For a summary of the challenges raised in response to the Norms, see U.N. 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human 
Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business En-
terprises with Regard to Human Rights, para. 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 
2005) [hereinafter High Commissioner Report]. 
 192. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 408 (“Initial enthusiasm for the [Norms] . . . has 
been muted.”). 
 193. Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 61st Sess., U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (2005). The Commission’s request was subsequently ap-
proved by the Economic and Social Council. Decision 2005/273, U.N. Econ. &  
Soc. Council, http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/documents/2005/decisions/Decision%20 
2005-273.pdf. 
 194. Norms, supra note 166, para. 1 (noting, also, that states have the primary respon-
sibility of protecting human rights and ensuring their observance by businesses). See also 
Ratner, supra note 161, at 508–10 (explaining the “corporate sphere” theory as a set of 
concentric circles, where the greatest duty runs to those with most ties to the corporation, 
while lesser duties run to those with less ties to the corporation). 
 195. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, para. 1(b), U.N Sub-
Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Commentary] (stating that the “due 
diligence” standard also encompasses an obligation of corporations to inform themselves 
of the human rights impact of their activities so that they can avoid being complicit in 
violations). 
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and cultural rights . . . and contribute to their realization, in particular the 
rights to . . . drinking water,” as well as to “refrain from actions which 
obstruct or impede the realization of those rights.”196 
The Norms provide for implementation by various entities, ranging 
from internal self-regulation by business enterprises to monitoring by 
other United Nations bodies, intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, investors, lenders and consumers, states, 
and so forth.197 In particular, the Norms require businesses to adopt the 
provisions of the Norms in internal codes of conduct, disseminate them 
to stakeholders and the public, incorporate them into their business con-
tracts, and undertake monitoring and periodic reports.198 As part of their 
monitoring obligations, businesses are required to study the human rights 
impact of major projects they undertake, within the limits of their re-
sources and capabilities, to make the results available to stakeholders, 
and to consider stakeholder reactions.199 Moreover, the Norms require 
corporations to engage in periodic assessments of their compliance with 
the Norms and to make these assessments available to stakeholders to the 
same extent as their annual reports.200 Where assessments show inade-
quate compliance, the Norms call upon businesses to develop a plan of 
action for reparation and redress.201 In addition to actions by the compa-
nies, the Norms provide for judicial determination of damages and 
criminal sanctions against incompliant companies, in accordance with 
national and international law.202 
The Norms impose substantive obligations and detailed implementa-
tion procedures that go well beyond the general guidelines of prior vol-
untary models.203 With respect to the right to water, the Norms could 
provide an invaluable tool for ensuring that water privatization will not 
endanger—and, indeed, that it will contribute to the realization of—the 
right to water. 
                                                                                                             
 196. Norms, supra note 166, para. 12. As the Commentary explains, this provision 
explicitly obligates corporations to “observe standards which protect the right to water 
and are otherwise in accordance with [General Comment 15].”  Commentary, supra note 
195, para. 12(b). 
 197. For an overview of the implementation procedures envisioned by the Norms, see 
Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 915–21. 
 198. Norms, supra note 166, paras. 15–16; Commentary, supra note 195, paras. 15–16. 
 199. Commentary, supra note 195, para. 16(i). 
 200. Id. para 16(g). 
 201. Id. para 16(h). 
 202. Norms, supra note 166, para 18. 
 203. See Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 15. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. Analysis of the Possible Scope of Liability of Private Water Providers 
for Violations of the Right to Water and its Enforcement 
Reading the provisions of Comment 15 and the Norms on corporate 
accountability together, it is possible to examine hypothetically the scope 
and nature of corporate responsibility for violations of the human right to 
water in the context of privatized water utilities. Maria McFarland 
Sánchez-Moreno and Tracy Higgins have argued that privatization 
should not constitute a per se violation of the right to water.204 Instead, in 
their view, privatization might indeed contribute to the realization of the 
right to water.205 Nevertheless, the particular circumstances in which pri-
vatization is carried out might give rise to substantive and procedural 
violations of the right to water.206 
Commenting on the privatization of water in Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
Sánchez-Moreno and Higgins have argued that the Bolivian government 
might have violated substantive provisions of the right to water, in par-
ticular the principles of equity and affordability,207 by approving rate in-
creases without providing for mechanisms to protect its poor residents.208 
Furthermore, the failure of the Bolivian government to create timely op-
                                                                                                             
 204. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1775–76 (describing, but rejecting 
the view that privatization might be seen as a per se violation of the human right to wa-
ter). Drawing on William Finnegan’s article on Cochabamba in The New Yorker, the 
authors note that the peasants in Cochabamba viewed the concessionaire as inherently 
interfering with their customary habit of using water for free. Id. at 1775. This view was 
captured in the expression that the concessionaire attempted to “lease the rain.”  Id. See 
also Finnegan, supra note 11. 
 205. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1776. Cf. Human Rights Resolu-
tion 2005/69, supra note 193, pmbl. (recognizing that “the responsible operation of trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises and effective national legislation can 
contribute to the promotion of respect for human rights and assist in channelling the 
benefits of business towards this goal . . . .”). But see Kothari, supra note 39 (contending 
that privatization erodes the human rights to housing, water, and sanitation). 
 206. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1776. 
 207. Comment 15, supra note 109, paras. 12(c)(ii), 27. 
 208. Id. para. 44(a)–(b). See Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1776–79. 
The authors also observe that the concession arrangements between the Bolivian gov-
ernment and the concessionaire might have interfered with customary uses of water by 
Cochabamba peasants, but note that such interference would only give rise to a violation 
if carried in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 1779. They argue that arbitrariness may be in-
ferred from the fact that the interference “was merely a byproduct of the deal [between 
the government and the consortium] structured to serve other purposes.”  Id. 
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portunities for citizens to participate in the passing of water laws violates 
the procedural rights of participation and information.209 
Applying the requirements of Comment 15 and the Norms in this con-
text would extend analogous obligations to a private water provider, 
qualified by the limiting standard of “due diligence,” which is expressly 
stated in the Norms. Thus, under the standard of “due diligence” a pri-
vate water provider would be liable for violating the substantive right to 
affordable water by designing rate increases without mitigation mecha-
nisms for poor households, to the extent that the company knew or 
should have known of the consequences of rate increases on the poorest 
residents that it serves.210 Since the Norms also impose an affirmative 
duty on companies to inform themselves of the effect of their activities 
on human rights, a company that was unaware of the consequences of 
rate hikes on the poor residents that it serves would also arguably violate 
its duty of due diligence.211 
The procedural rights of information and participation by relevant 
stakeholders promulgated in Comment 15 as components of the right to 
water are supplemented by the implementation procedures of disclosure 
and monitoring envisioned by the drafters of the Norms. Under the moni-
toring obligations of the Norms, a private water provider has an affirma-
tive duty to conduct studies of the human rights impact of proposed pri-
vatization contracts. Such duty would compel private water providers to 
put their superior institutional resources into designing innovative pricing 
solutions, such as differential pricing and subsidies for low-income users 
to ensure affordability and access to minimum amounts of water for all. 
In addition, since Comment 15 provides for procedural rights to informa-
tion and participation212 of affected people, water providers would be 
required not only to make available the results of human rights studies to 
stakeholders, but to consult the local communities affected by their ac-
tivities. Imposing a relationship of correlative duties and rights between 
multinational water providers and sub-sovereign entities, such as affected 
communities, could fill in regulatory gaps resulting from weak or corrupt 
governments and prevent cooperation with authoritarian ones. The re-
quirements further ensure that corporations will refrain from dealing with 
                                                                                                             
 209. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1781–86. 
 210. See Commentary, supra note 195, para. 1(b). See also Sánchez-Moreno & Hig-
gins, supra note 12, at 1786–87 (discussing the potential liabilities of the consortium 
involved in Cochabamba). 
 211. See Commentary, supra note 196, para. 1(b). 
 212. The right to public participation under Comment 15 extends to groups and indi-
viduals, over and above the participation by national and local officials. Sánchez-Moreno 
& Higgins, supra note 12, at 1782. 
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governments behind closed-doors without public input, thereby increas-
ing the transparency of the negotiations between water companies and 
governments. 
Enforcement of corporate responsibility of the human right to water 
may prove difficult. Although a discussion of enforcement strategies and 
possible forums is beyond the scope of this Note, it will suffice to point 
out two main barriers. First, the passage of time is necessary before the 
Norms and Comment 15 mature into “hard law.” In this respect, future 
support by the United Nations and the community of states is critical. 
Second, although the Norms envision enforcement by international tri-
bunals and national courts,213 there is presently no complaint mechanism 
to bring violations of economic, social and cultural rights to the attention 
of the ESCR Committee. Nevertheless, violations of the right to water 
might be brought before regional human rights forums, where the rele-
vant treaties cover economic, social and cultural rights, provided that 
other jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.214 Enforcement by national 
courts has been utilized, for example, in South Africa, although it should 
be borne in mind that the right to water is enshrined in the South African 
Constitution.215 Despite the difficulties of enforcement through litigation, 
using the Norms and Comment 15 as a publicity tool may be a powerful 
means of bringing international pressure on private water providers to 
incorporate human rights provisions in their contracts with governments 
and to adopt internal self-regulation policies. 
B. The Desirability of a Human Rights Approach to Water Privatization 
Considering the degree to which private water operators supplant or 
replace public entities in the delivery of water services, especially in de-
veloping countries, the elaboration of global mechanisms to protect and 
ensure access to water becomes paramount. As commentators on both 
sides of the private-public debate have recognized, the global scope of 
                                                                                                             
 213. Norms, supra note 166, para. 18. 
 214. See, e.g., Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights art.16(1), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“Every individual shall have the 
right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. S. Metro. Local Council 2002 (6) 
BCLR 625 (W) (S. Afr.) (holding that plaintiffs’ disconnection from water supply consti-
tuted a prima facie violation of their right to water). See also Michael Kidd, Not a Drop 
to Drink: Disconnection of Water Services for Non-Payment and the Right of Access to 
Water, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 119 (2004), available at http://wwwserver.law.wits. 
ac.za/sajhr/2004/kidd.pdf. Where the right to water is not enshrined in a national constitu-
tion, the requirement of implementing legislation before treaty obligations become en-
forceable, especially in dualist countries, may prevent direct enforcement through na-
tional courts. 
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the water crisis requires global solutions. The exploration of public-
private partnerships, extolled by international financial institutions, must 
go hand-in-hand with developing mechanisms for holding multinational 
water companies responsible for the human right to water. 
A human rights approach to water privatization is desirable for several 
reasons. First, by bringing the scrutiny of the international community to 
bear upon the activities of multinational water companies, the human 
rights approach alleviates the power inequity between transnational cor-
porations and governments of developing countries. Moreover, a human 
rights approach to water privatization would ensure the participation of 
the local people as “stakeholders” affected by privatization. Such partici-
pation not only protects the interests of affected communities, but also 
reduces the political risk for private investors, possibly preempting some 
of the privatization fiascos, like the water war in Bolivia. 
Second, a human rights approach contributes to the goal of universal 
access to water by clarifying that water is “a legal entitlement, rather 
than a commodity or service provided on a charitable basis.”216 Imposing 
a binding duty for the human right to water on private water providers is 
necessary to ensure that the right will not be violated where the host gov-
ernments are unable or unwilling to regulate. 
Nevertheless, some of the objections pertaining to corporate responsi-
bility for human rights in general may attain heightened force in the con-
text of a “welfare” right such as the human right to water. For example, 
an objection may be raised that companies should not be forced to as-
sume responsibilities that have traditionally been accorded to states, such 
as providing for the welfare of the citizenry.217 Countering such objec-
tions, the Norms clearly state that states remain the primary addressees of 
human rights law.218 In addition, the Norms limit corporate accountabil-
ity through the theory of the corporate sphere, ensuring that corporations 
are not subjected to a sweeping obligation to the general citizenry.219 
Thus, under the Norms, a transnational company that operates in a host 
                                                                                                             
 216. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 9 (also noting that the human rights ap-
proach empowers individuals to realize their human rights, rather than seeing them as 
“passive recipients of aid”). 
 217. Indeed, it is still contested whether states have such responsibilities. See supra 
Part III.C. 
 218. Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 14. 
 219. See High Commissioner Report, supra note 191, para. 36 (“In contrast to the lim-
its on States’ human rights obligations, the boundaries of the human rights responsibili-
ties of business are not easily defined by reference to territorial limits. . . . Defining the 
boundaries of business responsibility for human rights therefore requires the considera-
tion of other factors, such as the size of the company, the relationship with its partners, 
the nature of its operations, and the proximity of people to its operations.”). 
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state, but does not otherwise provide water services, does not—like its 
host state—have a general affirmative duty to undertake positive steps 
toward the realization of the right to water of the citizens of the host 
state. However, a transnational corporation that is engaged in the provi-
sion of water services would be bound by an affirmative duty running not 
to the general citizenry, but to those water consumers affected by corpo-
rate activity. 220 
The recent developments regarding the elaboration of a human right to 
water and corporate responsibility for human rights may go some way 
toward addressing the problems posed by the privatization of a resource 
essential to human life, while at the same time preserving the benefits of 
privatization. Whether the Norms will develop into “hard law” that 
would be binding and enforceable against private water providers re-
mains to be seen. 
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 220. In this respect, it should be noted that corporate responsibility for the human right 
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